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Abstract 
This article examines evolving gendered protection narratives surrounding four 
‘abduction’ cases in which Sahrawi refugee girls and young women living in 
Spain were ‘abducted’ by their birth families and forcibly returned to the 
Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee camps between 2002 and 2009. By exploring 
Spanish state and civil society responses to these girls’ ‘abductions’, I argue that 
there has been a major shift in the ways in which legitimate responsibility and 
authority over Sahrawi refugee women as Muslim female forced migrants have 
been conceptualised and invoked by Spanish actors. I therefore assess the 
gendered nature of competing claims of responsibility to ‘protect’ Sahrawi 
refugee women both within and outside of the Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee 
camps, exploring the motivations and implications of different actors’ in/actions 
towards these girls and women. With Polisario claiming to represent and act as a 
liberal ‘state’ committed to protecting the rights of its ‘refugee-citizens’ in some 
instances, whilst denying politico-legal responsibility in others, the question of 
‘who’ or ‘what’ claims the legitimate authority to ‘protect’ Sahrawi refugee 
women and girls is thus accentuated by such cases. By exploring shifts in Spanish 
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public and political discourses of responsibility over the past decade on the one 
hand, and the accentuation of competing discourses as presented by Spanish, 
Polisario and Algerian actors on the other, the article highlights the complex 
nature and implications of the ‘intimate’ Spanish civil society networks which 
ensure the physical and political survival of the Sahrawi refugee camps. 
Ultimately, I argue that Sahrawi girls and women have become hypervisible in 
Spain, being conceptualised as women who ‘belong’ to the Spanish nation which 
in turn has a responsibility to ‘protect’ ‘our’ Sahrawi women from ‘their’ culture. 
Keywords: abduction; contested sovereignty; Orientalism; protection scenarios; 
refugee women; Sahrawi refugees 
 
 
Introduction 
Contrary to the earlier invisibility of women in migration studies, migrant and refugee 
women have become key protagonists in academic debates and policies surrounding the 
causes, nature and implications of different forms of migration (Indra 1989; Dustin and 
Phillips 2008). Multiple challenges posed by feminists to reportedly ‘gender-neutral’ 
understandings of ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration have led to the documentation of 
gendered causes and experiences of migration and displacement (Indra 1999; Mahler and 
Pessar 2006), recognising that gender relations and identities influence and are affected 
by living in refugee camps in the south (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009), applying for asylum in 
the north (Bloch et al. 2000), or attempting to integrate into ‘multicultural’ host states and 
asylum states around the world (Matsuoka and Sorensen 1999). Debates prompted by 
feminists in the 1980s and 1990s motivated, amongst other things, an exploration of 
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states’, international organisations’, and civil society’s responsibility to ‘protect’ migrant 
and minority women from practices defined by Western observers as ‘abusive,’ ‘illiberal’ 
and ‘violent,’ focusing on practices including ‘forced marriage’, ‘child marriage’ or 
‘female genital surgeries’ (Okin 1998; Cohen et al. 1999; Phillips 2003, 2007).  
 
While campaigns and legislation have been developed to protect minority citizen women 
and female migrants from such forms of violence in Western states (ibid), legal and 
policy frameworks have also been developed by states and bodies such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to protect refugee women from 
violence in southern-based refugee camps (UNHCR 1995), and to recognise these 
practices and other forms of gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum in the north 
(i.e. Canadian IRB 1996; UNHCR 2002, 2009). Such guidelines and policies 
institutionalise the international community’s responsibility to protect girls and women 
from what are perceived to be religiously, culturally and politically sanctioned forms of 
gender-based violence in their places of origin. Indeed, far from the earlier invisibility of 
migrant women and Western states’ “laissez-faire tolerance or indifference” (Phillips and 
Dustin 2004, 419), shifts within academia and state policies have led to migrant and 
refugee women’s rights coming to be “at the top of the political agenda” (Roggeband and 
Verloo 2007, 271). The need to ‘protect’ migrant and minority women has thus emerged 
as “an ‘emblematic’ policy problem” (272) for Western states active not only within their 
own territory, but also across the south through development and humanitarian 
programmes and, in certain instances, even via military interventions.  
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However, not all migrant or refugee women are perceived to be equally 
vulnerable or in need of protection; rather, “the category of migrant women is shrinking” 
in Europe, with concerns about “gender and migrants’ rights” increasingly revolving 
around Muslim migrant women (Roggeband and Verloo 2007, 283). Indeed, regarding 
asylum-seeking and refugee women, Akram (2000) and others (incl. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2010) have critiqued the development and institutionalisation of neo-Orientalist 
protection narratives and politico-legal structures which construct Muslim refugee 
women as eternal victims of what is monolithically portrayed as an intrinsically violent 
and barbaric religion. Western state and non-state policies ostensibly designed to 
‘protect’ migrant and refugee women in the public and private spheres are thus revealed 
to be based upon a “discursive strategy that constructs gender subordination as integral 
only to certain [non-Western] cultures” solidifying a separation and hierarchy between 
‘us’ (liberal, equal) and ‘them’ (illiberal, barbaric and oppressive of women), for highly 
political purposes (Volpp 2001, 1181). By opposing race and religion with gender in such 
debates, the ‘positional superiority’ of Western culture is reinforced over Other cultures 
(Nader 1989) as a means of justifying Western intervention to “save brown women from 
brown men” (Spivak 1993, 93). Western actors have thus established violence against 
Muslim migrant women as a central concern, proposing the necessity of ‘saving’ these 
women from ‘their’ ‘culture,’ and perceiving the West as being responsible for solving 
this problem across a range of geographies. 
With these debates and criticisms in mind, this article examines Spanish civil 
society and institutional responses to the ‘abductions’ of four Sahrawi refugee girls and 
women for whom state responsibility is both unclear and highly politicised. After a brief 
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overview of the Sahrawi refugee situation, the article examines two sets of case-studies 
involving Sahrawi girls and young women who left their Algerian-based refugee camps 
as young teenagers to live and study in Spain. By exploring Spanish state and civil 
society responses to these girls’ ‘abductions’ by their birth-families and their forced 
return to the Sahrawi camps, I argue that there has been a major shift in the ways in 
which legitimate responsibility and authority over Sahrawi refugee women as Muslim 
female forced migrants have been conceptualised and invoked by Spanish actors. Hence, 
Spanish responses to the separate ‘abductions’ of Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu in the early-
2000s all revolved around the demand that Polisario Front, as the Sahrawi’s ‘legitimate’ 
political representatives and effective leaders of the Sahrawi state-in-exile, should be held 
accountable for these young women’s ‘abductions’ by their birth-families, meeting 
Spanish cultural, political and legal norms accordingly. Unlike these early cases, recent 
legal and political events in Spain surrounding the abduction of Mimouna in 2008-2009 
reflect a move away from Spanish families and civil society summoning Polisario’s 
responsibility over Sahrawi women, towards invoking Algeria’s responsibility as Sahrawi 
refugees’ ‘host state’ and de-jure authority over the camps. Overall, this article therefore 
identifies and examines the competing nature of Spanish, Polisario and Algerian claims 
vis-à-vis jurisdictional responsibility over Sahrawi refugee women in Spain and in the 
Algerian-based refugee camps, exploring the motivations and implications of different 
actors’ in/actions. By exploring shifts in Spanish public and political discourses of 
responsibility over the past decade on the one hand, and the accentuation of competing 
discourses presented by Spanish, Polisario and Algerian actors on the other, the article 
highlights the complex nature and implications of the ‘intimate’ Spanish civil society 
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networks which ensure the physical and political survival of the Sahrawi camps. 
Ultimately, I argue that Sahrawi girls and women have become hypervisible in Spain, 
being conceptualised by Spanish observers as ‘belonging’ to Spanish families and the 
Spanish nation which are represented as holding legitimate responsibility to ensure the 
‘protection’ of ‘our’ Sahrawi girls and women from ‘their’ oppressive familial and 
cultural practices and traditions.  
This article analyses the content, discursive frames and aims of high-profile 
‘liberation’ campaigns mobilised in Spain as a response to these four ‘abductions’. These 
campaigns were selected due to their highly public and politicised nature, and the article 
therefore examines publically available sources produced and distributed in Spain over 
the course of over a decade.1 The analysis of these sources draws on insights derived 
from three fieldwork visits to the Saharawi refugee camps (2001-2007), and extensive 
research conducted with and about Sahrawi adults and children in Algeria, Cuba, Libya, 
South Africa, Spain and Syria (2001-present), including over 100 interviews with 
Sahrawi refugees, and more than 40 interviews with Spanish humanitarians (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh 2009, 2010, 2011).  
Importantly, given the nature of these campaigns, only certain voices and 
discourses have been publically projected, with the young women and their foster-
families, alongside Spanish lawyers, judges and journalists, and the official Polisario 
representatives having been hypervisible and hyperaudible in media and political 
accounts. In contrast, in the first set of cases, the perspectives of Aicha’s, Huria’s and 
Fatimetu’s birth-families remained entirely absent from the Spanish public sphere, while 
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in the more recent ‘abduction’ case, Mimouna’s father and brother have occasionally 
been cited by the Spanish media. 
Before turning to the ‘abductions’, a brief overview of the Western Saharan 
conflict and an introduction to the Sahrawi refugee camps and their support structures is 
necessary.  
  
Brief history  
A Spanish colony from 1884-1975/1976, the Western Sahara was placed on the UN 
Decolonisation Committee’s agenda in 1964. Anti-colonial movements developed in the 
1960s and 1970s, and in 1973, the Polisario Front was born, gaining popular support as it 
firstly resisted Spanish colonialism, and later Moroccan and Mauritanian claims over the 
territory. Although Spain conducted a census of the population in December 1974 to 
prepare for a referendum for self-determination, Spain withdrew from the territory in 
late-1975. Rather than leading to decolonisation, 350,000 Moroccan civilians entered the 
territory in November 1975, facing no resistance from Spanish or international forces, as 
part of the ‘Green March’ designed to recover the Moroccan state’s ‘Southern Provinces.’ 
Approximately 20,000 Moroccan soldiers soon joined from the North (Chopra,1999), 
while Mauritanian forces entered from the South, ignoring UN Resolutions which 
deplored the march and called for its termination (i.e.Res.380, 6 November 1975). 
Following Franco’s death, the armed conflict between Morocco, Mauritania and Polisario 
intensified, with a mass Sahrawi exodus being displaced to other parts of the territory, 
and later, following the bombardment of these first encampments (Mercer 1979), to the 
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nascent Algerian-based refugee camps near these countries’ common border (for a 
detailed history, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009).  
Since the mid-1970s, Polisario has governed and administered the Sahrawi 
refugee camps and its refugee population (approximately 155,000 people) via the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the ‘state in exile’ constituted by Polisario 
on 27 March 1976 (one day after Spain officially withdrew from its colony and 
unilaterally declared that it was no longer the administrating power). Polisario/SADR has 
its own constitution, camp-based police force, army and parallel state and religious legal 
systems. The constitution states that Polisario will remain the only authorised political 
group until an independent Western Sahara is established; opposition parties are not 
permitted, and internal challenges to Polisario’s authority have been repressed since the 
camps’ establishment (Amnesty International 1996; HRW 2008, 116).  
Unlike refugee camps which are controlled by international organisations such as 
the UNHCR, Polisario/SADR is “the only authority with which [Sahrawi] camp residents 
have regular contact” (HRW 2008, 9). Despite being on Algerian territory, the Algerian 
government has effectively “ceded de facto administration” to Polisario/SADR (ibid), 
enabling them to “manage their own civil society and social systems without 
interference” (WFP 2009–2010, 7; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011). Such high levels of self-
management and Polisario’s de facto control over the Algerian territory upon which the 
camps have been built, distinguish the Sahrawi camps from the majority of refugee camp 
contexts around the world. 
Polisario/SADR’s camp-based administrative and institutional capacities have 
been widely commended by international observers, with the camps denominated “the 
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best run refugee camps in the world” and “models of efficient local government” (Brazier 
1997, 14). Indeed, in her seminal work, Imposing Aid (1986), Harrell-Bond labelled the 
Sahrawi camps a ‘success story’ amidst a failing system which creates ‘dependency 
syndrome’ amongst refugees (also Voutira and Harrell-Bond 2000, 66). Importantly, a 
range of intersecting claims have been projected internationally to demonstrate the ‘ideal’ 
nature of Polisario/SADR and ‘its’ camps, including in a 1986 report written following an 
Oxfam desk-officer’s visit to the camps:  
 
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Sahrawi society is that it is the most 
fundamentally balanced society I have ever come across in terms of the relationships 
between men and women (Mowles 1986, 9). 
 
As I have argued elsewhere, gender equality and women’s ‘empowerment’ have become 
central and recurrent features in both Polisario/SADR and Western accounts of life in the 
Sahrawi camps (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009, 2010, 2011). Mainstream academic and civil 
society claims regarding the ‘ideal’ nature of the camps demonstrate that while 
Polisario/SADR has constructed and developed the camps internally, this ‘liberation 
movement’ has concurrently obtained the approval of key actors in the international arena 
by adhering to “the trinity of democratisation, good governance and women’s rights” 
(Kandiyoti 2004, 134). 
Indeed, since its birth in 1973, Polisario/SADR has been recognised as the 
‘legitimate’ representatives of the Saharawi people by over 70 non-Western states 
worldwide, and political conflicts have ensued between states and organisations (such as 
Algeria and the Organisation of African Union) which recognised and lobbied in favour 
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of Polisario/SADR’s struggle for independence, and those which did not. From 1976 to 
the present, the Western Saharan conflict has thus been dominated by Morocco and 
Polisario attempting to convince state and non-state actors to support their respective 
political standpoints, and recognise the legitimacy of their claims over the territory and its 
inhabitants.  
Polisario/SADR has been widely successful in its ‘international relations strategy’ 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009), with the camp-based SADR having full diplomatic relations 
with the abovementioned states and key regional bodies such as the African Union (AU). 
As a full member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and later AU, SADR has 
signed and ratified numerous African Human Rights Charters (including those pertaining 
to the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the Rights of Women in Africa), and its 
Constitution also refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thereby 
effectively rendering itself accountable to these international human rights frameworks. 
However, although SADR is recognised as a state by over 70 states, and has acted 
“as a state” by ratifying OAU/AU regional human rights conventions, Polisario holds 
neither observer status at the UN (Wilson 1988, 141), nor any other form of official status 
or recognition before the UN (OHCHR 2006). Indeed, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) notes that Polisario/SADR “has no 
international obligations under international human rights treaties,” arguing that it is 
Algeria, as the host state, which is legally responsible for all Sahrawi refugees residing in 
its territory (OHCHR 2006, 11). Specifically, OHCHR notes that although Algeria “holds 
that it bears no responsibility with regard to the human rights situation of the Sahrawi 
people” (since Algeria recognises SADR’s jurisdiction and, in effect sovereignty, over 
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the camps), “no international human rights treaty body has specifically validated this 
view with regard to the international human rights obligations accepted by Algeria” (13). 
In OHCHR’s view, “Algeria should take all relevant measures to ensure that all 
individuals present on its territory benefit from the protection of the international human 
rights conventions to which it is a party” (13). Simultaneously, however, Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) argues that “although Algeria remains ultimately responsible ... Polisario 
needs to be accountable for how it treats the people under its administration” (HRW 
2008, 9). 
An anomalous situation thereby exists whereby Polisario/SADR is simultaneously 
recognised as a state by some members of the international community, presents itself as 
a state which is obliged to adhere to central tenets of international human rights law and 
specific obligations to protect women and children, and yet is also classified as a non-
state actor by the UN and other actors who argue that “it has no international obligations 
under international human rights treaties” (OHCHR 2006, 13) and therefore cannot 
formally be held accountable to the Charters which it has signed ‘as a state’. This case is 
therefore not only relevant to on-going debates surrounding the responsibilities of non-
state actors in armed conflict around the world, but also raises specific questions 
surrounding the responsibilities of state, quasi-state, and non-state actors to ‘protect’ 
Sahrawi refugees living under the ‘jurisdiction’ of SADR. In the context of this article, 
precisely which actors consider themselves or are considered by others to be responsible 
to protect specific refugees – male or female, adult or child – becomes an even more 
pertinent issue. 
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Spain and Polisario 
In many countries which have not recognised SADR, Polisario has Representatives, 
rather than Ambassadors, who lobby national governments and civil society in favour of 
the Sahrawi ‘cause’ for independence. One such country is Spain, which has dozens of 
Representatives of the ‘Sahrawi Government’ (a term used widely in the Spanish media) 
across the country. Given this article’s focus on Spanish actors’ representation of 
gendered protection narratives pertaining to Sahrawi refugee women and girls since the 
early-2000s, a brief overview is necessary of the form and level of support offered by 
Spanish individuals and institutions, despite the Spanish government not having 
recognised SADR.  
An extensive network of support for Polisario/SADR exists in Spain, including 
over 300 groups of ‘Friends of the Sahrawi People’ across the country (Crivello, Fiddian 
and Chatty 2005); more than 200 civil-society associations with over 14,700 active 
members coordinated by the Coordinadora Estatal de Asociaciones Solidarias con el 
Sahara (CEAS); and a federation of Spanish state institutions ‘in solidarity’ with the 
Sahrawi people. These and other groups lobby the Spanish government to resolve the 
Western Saharan conflict; regional and local organisations run significant development 
programmes in the camps and awareness-/fund-raising campaigns in Spain, and ensure 
that the refugee situation remains on national and international political radars. They also 
help to coordinate the ‘Holidays in Peace’ programme which allows 10,000 Sahrawi 
children aged 8-12 to spend the summer months in Spain, thereby allowing them to avoid 
the hottest periods in the camps (Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010).  
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Spanish host-families then travel to the camps en masse during the Easter and 
Christmas holidays, taking food, money, medicine, clothes and toys to ‘their’ Sahrawi 
family, thereby having the opportunity to see living conditions in situ. The connections 
built between Sahrawi and Spanish host-families during these visits are perceived by 
refugees as being essential for both their short-term and longer-term prospects, allowing 
children to benefit directly during the summer itself and to return to the camps bearing 
gifts, money, medical supplies and food for their immediate and extended families.  
Highlighting the significance of the connections built between Sahrawi and 
Spanish families, the World Food Programme (WFP) identifies “the very vulnerable 
households” in the Sahrawi camps as those which “had not built any contacts with the 
civil societies of Spain and of other countries that provide support to refugee families” 
(WFP 2008, 3, emphasis added). In effect, it is this palpable connection and physical 
proximity to the people who provide such essential material and financial assistance, 
alongside social capital, which leads many Sahrawi families to recognise the significance 
of the support offered by Spanish civil society, in contrast with the less visible, and more 
taken-for-granted humanitarian projects which are marginalised in both the popular and 
the ‘national’ (Polisario/SADR) imagination (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009). Following 
Betteridge’s work on formal and personal gift exchange in Iran (1985), elsewhere I have 
argued that we could conceptualise this as a perceived distinction between invisible and 
anonymous ‘official aid’ and hyper-visible and personally granted ‘intimate aid’ 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009).  
This system of ‘intimate aid’ offers Sahrawi families and Polisario alike numerous 
possibilities: they increase families’ social and financial capital, while bilateral 
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agreements made with SADR Ministries and Polisario organs, including Polisario’s 
Youth and Women’s Unions, legitimate the Polisario/SADR’s authority and capacity as a 
bona fide ‘governmental’ (or at least quasi-governmental) partner (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2009, 2010). Simultaneously, such connections have also led to conflicts and crises both 
between individual Spanish and Sahrawi families, and between Spanish actors and 
Polisario/SADR more broadly.  
I will now examine a selection of cases characterised by Spanish actors overtly 
challenging Polisario/SADR to ‘protect’ Sahrawi girls and women in line with Spanish 
priorities. In the first set of cases, Polisario/SADR has been challenged by Spanish state 
and non-state actors to fulfil its politico-legal responsibilities towards ‘its’ female 
refugee-citizens as ‘the Sahrawi Government,’ thereby reinscribing Polisario/SADR as 
the de facto and legitimate authority over the camps and refugee inhabitants, and 
solidifying the representation of the Polisario/SADR as an entity which is deeply 
committed to upholding women’s rights. In the second case-study, however, 
Polisario/SADR’s claims to institutional ‘state’ power and mandate are explicitly 
contested through Spanish invocations of Algerian accountability as the, until now, 
largely ‘invisible’ host-state. In both instances, I argue that Spanish families and civil 
society on the one hand, and the Spanish state on the other are represented as holding 
legitimate responsibility to ensure the protection of ‘our’ Sahrawi girls and women from 
‘their’ oppressive Sahrawi practices, thereby justifying the extension of Spanish 
‘tentacles’ to ‘rescue’ them within and outside of Spain’s national territory.2  
 
The early challenge: ‘Abductions’ and Polisario’s ‘responsibility’ to protect 
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As an extension of the summer hosting programme, large numbers of Sahrawi boys and 
girls have been fostered by Spanish families to facilitate access to secondary and tertiary 
educations and/or medical treatment in Spain (Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010). 
Although Polisario/SADR does not officially approve of medium- to long-term fostering, 
whenever a Sahrawi child is fostered in Spain, the Sahrawi birth- and Spanish foster-
families sign a legal agreement before a Sahrawi state judge from the SADR Ministry of 
Justice and Religious Affairs. These documents specifies that: the host-family is granted 
temporary custody and guardianship of the child; the child is to be returned to his/her 
birth-family at the Sahrawi family’s request; and the host-family is responsible for 
maintaining the child’s family and cultural ties and facilitating regular communication 
with the child’s parents and family (RASD 2000).3 The existence and terms of these 
contracts reflect Sahrawi families’ concerns that their children might lose their cultural 
identity and linguistic abilities whilst living abroad (Chatty, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and 
Crivello 2010; Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010), whilst simultaneously echoing an 
Islamically-based understanding that adoption (and much less so fostering) creates 
neither legal nor relational ties between individuals (The Qur’an, sura 33, 4; Mernissi 
2003, 57).  
These agreements therefore highlight the temporary nature of fostering 
relationships, centralising the Sahrawi families’ rights to maintain familial, cultural, legal 
and relational ties with their children despite the physical distance arising while their sons 
and daughters are hosted by Spanish families; equally importantly, the SADR 
Constitution defines the family as the fundamental unit of Sahrawi society, and notes the 
inviolability of the Sahrawi household. 
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 Ultimately, however, as the cases of Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu demonstrate, the 
enforcement of these informal agreements is highly problematic given the tentative status 
of Polisario/SADR as a quasi-state actor, fostered children’s lack of citizenship, and the 
unequal political, legal, economic and social capital held by Sahrawi birth-families and 
Spanish foster parents. Indeed, despite Polisario/SADR officially distancing themselves 
from these fostering arrangements, Polisario/SADR has nonetheless been summoned by 
Spanish civil-society and political and legal institutions to intervene when conflicts have 
arisen between Spanish and Sahrawi families over Sahrawi girls and young women 
formerly been based in Spain. Importantly, rather than upholding the elements specified 
in the fostering agreements themselves, including Spanish foster-families’ commitment to 
return Sahrawi children to their birth-family at the Sahrawi family’s request, and to 
maintain the child’s family and cultural ties, in the early-2000s Spanish families, civil 
society and politico-legal figures repeatedly demanded that Polisario/SADR intervene to 
uphold Spanish priorities vis-a-vis ‘the best interests of the child,’ or, more specifically, 
‘the best interests of the girl-child/young woman’.  
Indeed, it is particularly noteworthy that no parallel high-profile cases involving 
boys or young men have emerged in the Spanish media, despite a number of Sahrawi 
boys/young men having been asked to return to the camps following short- and long-term 
fostering in Spain (interviews, 27 February Camp, April-May 2007). Given the lack of 
reliable information regarding the number or gender of Sahrawi children who are fostered 
in Spain, or the gender of those who are asked to return to the camps, it is difficult to 
identify precisely how fostering and ‘returns’ to the camps are gendered in nature. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the absence of Spanish media, legal and political 
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campaigns relating to the return of boys and young men to the camps highlights the 
extent to which the ‘abduction’ of Sahrawi girls and young women has attracted the 
Spanish public’s imagination and media coverage, in turn suggesting a particularly strong 
sense of responsibility towards the protection of Sahrawi girls and young women by 
virtue of their gender, age and nationality.  
 
Introducing the early cases 
Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu lived and studied in León, La Rioja and Asturias for seven, 
four and three years respectively before becoming the centre of a chain of Spanish media 
campaigns between 2001 and 2003 (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2006, 2010a). Aicha 
moved to Spain aged 12 to complete her secondary and tertiary education, while Huria 
and Fatimetu were fostered aged 11 and 12 respectively primarily for medical reasons: 
Huria due to serious dental complications, and Fatimetu because of her condition as a 
celiac (Fernández 2003). Despite the above-mentioned fostering contracts, Aicha 
returned only once in seven years to visit her family in the refugee camps, while Huria 
had not seen her biological parents for over 2 years (Díaz 2003). These experiences 
clearly reinforced their families’ anxieties that they might eventually lose their daughters 
entirely. Shortly after the girls reached puberty, their parents separately asked them to 
return to the camps to help care for their mothers: Aicha’s mother was enduring a high-
risk pregnancy; another girl’s mother had suffered a miscarriage, while the third had just 
recently given birth (Castaño-Boullón 2003; Guijarro 2003). All three women therefore 
reportedly required assistance and turned to their eldest daughters accordingly. In each 
case, the girls’ Spanish host-families eventually allowed ‘their’ foster-daughter to visit 
  18 
the camps for a short period. However, when their birth-families told Aicha, Huria and 
Fatimetu, aged 19, 16 and 17 respectively, that they would have to stay in the camps with 
their families rather than return to Spain, the Spanish host-families asserted that the girls 
had been ‘abducted,’ and proceeded to vigorously lobby for their ‘return home,’ to Spain.  
The degree of Spanish public support mobilised by the Spanish foster-families to 
‘liberate’ these young women from their birth-families cannot be overstated: in Aicha’s 
case, 17,000 Spaniards in the city of León signed a petition for her immediate return 
(Cazón 2004; Peregil 2002), while 12,000 signatures were collected in Avilés supporting 
Huria’s ‘liberation’ (González 2003a); the relevant debates and legal arguments reached 
not only the Spanish public via the media, but also higher political institutions such as the 
Spanish Congress, Foreign Ministry, and Senate; many local-level and several high-
ranking politicians offered Aicha and Huria their backing, and the Senate voted in June 
2002 in support of Aicha’s return to Spain (Cazón 2004, 187). Throughout these and 
other cases, Sahrawi refugees and events taking place in the Algerian-based Sahrawi 
refugee camps were categorised as ‘domestic’ and ‘national’ issues in the Spanish media, 
rather than an ‘international one’, indicating the extent to which the Sahrawi camps were 
perceived to be an extension of the Spanish national self. 
Alongside general claims that Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu’s rights to health and 
education were denied in the camps, the Spanish families and the girls themselves 
mobilised the Spanish press and political institutions through references to conditions in 
the camps, in particular claiming that Sahrawi family and cultural traditions violently 
oppress women’s rights. Importantly, the extreme representation of the subjugation of 
Sahrawi refugee women which was repeatedly and purposefully projected by Aicha, 
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Huria and Fatimetu, as well as by their Spanish host-families and much of the Spanish 
media was diametrically opposed to the Polisario/SADR and mainstream discourse vis-à-
vis ‘ideal’ Sahrawi gender relations referred to above.  
For instance, in her letter to the Spanish Authorities, Aicha writes: 
 
I feel I have been kidnapped, forced to adapt myself to so many traditions that I don’t 
even know where to start … If [X] doesn’t manage to speak with [the smuggler] I will 
spend the rest of my life as my own family’s prisoner, and I will be the crazy one who 
tried to escape because she didn’t agree with her clan’s rules … (Embarek, N.D.). 
 
Paralleling claims that Aicha’s ‘clan’ had imprisoned her and forced her to adapt to alien 
‘traditions,’ in a public letter addressed to the Queen of Spain, Huria denounces the 
Sahrawi way of life:  
 
That is the reason why I ask for your help. Do you think this is just? Here the women 
wear the burqa. Their lives are like Afghan women’s lives. So, please, help me to leave 
this place, I beg you. I don’t want to live the life that they lead, I want them to see that it 
is possible to change all this and to have rights (Hamoudi 2003, emphasis added). 
 
The terms and descriptions offered in these accounts, and especially the explicit 
references to Afghan women and the burqa, are clearly understood by these young 
women as epitomising the ‘worst’ possible conditions for Muslim women (also Stabile 
and Kumar 2005). Although Sahrawi women do not wear the burqa, the girls’ invoked 
these terms to convince Spanish observers that their plight to flee the refugee camps and 
  20 
their birth-families to return to their Spanish families was simultaneously understandable, 
just and necessary. As such, they seem to have recognised that a key factor which may 
pressure Western individuals, families and institutions to intervene in a crisis, or may at 
least be provided as a justification for intervention, is a particular representation of a 
cultural and religious prison which unjustly oppresses and subjugates women. Indeed, as 
has now been extensively documented, summoning the image of forcibly veiled Afghan 
women is particularly pertinent given the extent to which “the plight of Afghan women 
was invoked as a humanitarian crisis justifying military intervention” (Kandiyoti, 
interviewed by Hammami 2005, 1352; Stabile and Kumar 2005).  
Simultaneously, Huria’s personal (and political) identification in the extract above 
demonstrates a rejection of the Sahrawi ‘way of life,’ speaking of, and thus Othering, her 
birth-parents and refugee community as ‘them’ and ‘they’, whilst aligning herself with 
her Spanish family’s culture and civil norms (her imagined ‘we’ and ‘us’). In this sense, 
Huria’s physical separation from her birth parents while she was fostered in Spain can be 
perceived as resulting in a realignment of her sense of forming part of the Spanish Self – 
to paraphrase de Beauvoir, although Huria may have been ‘born’ a Sahrawi girl, through 
the ‘modernising’ fostering experience she has ‘become’ a Spanish woman (also Nash 
2005). 
These images were paralleled and expanded upon by those members of the 
Spanish media who supported the teenaged refugees’ ‘release,’ basing their reports on the 
specific details delineated in the young women’s letters and the Spanish families’ press 
releases, but concurrently drawing upon their own perceptions and beliefs surrounding 
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Sahrawi gender relations. Hence, one internet journalist who has not visited the refugee 
camps describes Sahrawi society as: 
 
a hell of ancestral customs which stamp on women’s most elemental rights; ... where 
women never come of age to obtain these [rights] and choose their way of life, not even 
to choose a husband because their own father chooses one for them when they are still 
girls, or they sell them or trade them for two camels, two goats or two donkeys; where 
men make laws only for themselves, always leaving their women in the margins (Suarez 
2003). 
 
Upon Aicha’s release, other journalists and commentators stated that Aicha had “won the 
battle against her parent’s ignorance and egoism,” parents who expected her to fulfil 
“the role that is reserved … for all of her nation’s first-born women: little more than 
slavery in the khayma [tent] in the refugee camps” (Alonso 2003, emphasis added); 
Alonso continues by stating that “Some religions and a certain Bedouin atavism keep 
women tied to the leg of the bed.”  
In all of these statements, Sahrawi society as a whole and Sahrawi parents more 
specifically are “constructed as timelessly misogynistic, barbaric and uncivilized,” 
naturalising both a “rhetoric of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and Orientalist constructions of 
the East upon which such a clash is predicated” (Stabile and Kumar, on representations of 
Afghanistan 2005, 774). As such, these accounts directly paralleled the monolithic 
depictions of subjugated, isolated and violated ‘third world women’ which Mohanty 
(1988), Spivak (1993) and others vehemently reject. Support was thus explicitly obtained 
for Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu’s ‘liberation’ from the camps via continuously negative 
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references to the Muslim identity of the Sahrawi, pinpointing oppressive veiling and 
marriage practices, and identifying different forms of family-sponsored violence against 
women; in these instances, the depiction of the girls’ biological families as illegitimate 
‘barbaric’ oppressors is implicitly and at times explicitly contrasted with Spanish foster-
families’ ‘civilised’ concern for ‘their’ (foster)daughters’ well-being (also see Nash 
regarding representations of legitimate kinship amongst birth and adoptive parents, 
2005). As I have suggested above and elsewhere (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010a), the images 
mobilised in these public campaigns therefore parallel the Orientalist imagery which is 
habitually reproduced by the West apropos the Muslim Arab Other, representing the neo-
colonial foundations of the gendered protection narratives which justify Western 
interventions to ‘protect’ and ‘liberate’ Muslim women in the south and north alike.  
The intersecting depictions arising in the case of Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu’s 
abductions therefore led to many members of Spanish civil society advocating for the 
girls’ ‘liberation’ from their oppressive birth parents and culture in the refugee camps, 
thereby directly engaging in “an Orientalist logic that paternalistically seeks to protect 
women” (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 775). Importantly, such gendered protection scenarios 
are dependent on both a “polarization between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ but also [upon] 
caricatures and stereotypes which bear little resemblance to reality” (Stabile and Kumar 
2005, 771; also Abu-Lughod 2002).  
  
Invoking Polisario’s powers to protect 
In a selection of documents published at the time of Aicha’s, Fatimetu’s and Huria’s 
‘abductions’ by their parents, a range of actors highlighted their views regarding 
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Polisario/SADR’s responsibilities towards these girls. Aicha herself, aged 19, is quoted as 
stating that, “for what has happened to me, for what is happening now, and for what will 
happen in the future, I blame only the POLISARIO FRONT [sic] which is directing my 
life,” with the same document indicating that Polisario had successfully traced her 
whereabouts and informed her, at the age of 21, that they had negotiated her ‘release’ and 
her right to continue studying in Spain (Embarek, N.D.). 
Aicha therefore suggests that Polisario was responsible for allowing her to be 
retained against her will throughout the almost two years she spent in the camps, and, 
eventually, for allowing her to return to Spain following the completion of an agreement 
between the Spanish and Sahrawi governments, and Aicha’s family. This confidence in 
Polisario’s power and capacity to convince the girls’ parents to allow them to return to 
Spain in line with Polisario/SADR’s stated commitment to women’s rights is reflected in 
almost all of the other Spanish documents consulted. For instance, Huria’s host-family 
states: 
 
We ask that the Saharawi authorities intervene immediately so that the norms of the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic can be fulfilled and Huria can return to Spain 
immediately to complete her medical treatment (N.A., N.D., emphasis added). 
 
In relation to Fatimetu’s retention in the camps despite her serious medical condition, the 
Riojan solidarity NGO indicates that:  
 
Considering these events, and their seriousness, we find it incredible that the Polisario 
Front and the government of the SADR, which you direct, could allow this form of 
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negligence towards the girls … (Grupo de Amistad de la Comunidad de la Rioja 2001, 
emphasis added). 
 
As these quotes indicate, whilst Polisario/SADR is a ‘government-in-exile’ and is wholly 
dependent on externally provided humanitarian aid, Aicha, the Spanish families and 
solidarity NGOs all asserted that Polisario was the organisation which should be 
approached to obtain the girls’ release in line with international human rights standards. 
In this sense, Spanish families invoked their ‘intimate’ ‘parental’ concern over the girls’ 
wellbeing to demand not only Spanish but also Sahrawi ‘state’ intervention in Sahrawi 
family life, summoning the state’s ‘legitimate’ power over Sahrawi refugee girls and 
women based in private households in the Sahrawi refugee camps. 
However, while Spanish families, civil society and politico-legal actors argued 
that Polisario/SADR should enact its state-like authority to protect these young women, 
the Polisario Delegation of Castilla y León issued a memorandum in relation to Aicha’s 
case in which they outline what the Saharawi Authorities felt was Polisario’s role vis-a-
vis the crisis: 
 
The Sahrawi authorities never become implicated between Sahrawi families and the host-
families given that they do not support temporary adoptions. In the case of Aicha…the 
Sahrawi authorities are making an effort to convince Aicha’s parents, but, they do not 
guarantee anything given the sensitive nature of the case in Sahrawi society, and it is not 
possible to launch a crusade for the liberation of Sahrawi women, using Aicha’s name as 
its motto, without knowing about the history and achievements in relation to Sahrawi 
women’s position today (Delegación Saharaui Castilla y León 2002).  
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Hence, whilst declaring that they are the sole and legitimate representatives of the 
Sahrawi people as a collectivity and as individual refugees, and claiming to be the 
government in charge of camps inhabited by powerful and active Sahrawi refugee 
women, in this and other declarations Polisario representatives in Spain highlighted that 
they could only attempt to convince Aicha’s parents, but could not guarantee success. To 
an extent, this may allude to the delicate balance which grants Polisario/SADR authority 
within the camps, and the terms of the socio-political contract uniting Sahrawi refugees to 
‘their’ representatives. In this sense, Polisario’s role and power as the ‘legitimate 
representatives’ of the Saharawi people will only last as long as ‘the Saharawi people’ 
agree with its decisions and rulings, and such interventions are represented by 
Polisario/SADR as solely being acceptable in particular public spheres and over 
particular refugees. In contrast, attempts to influence family decisions over the treatment 
of particular (especially young and female) refugees within the household are portrayed 
as especially ‘sensitive,’ potentially interfering in intimate private spaces protected by the 
SADR Constitution and undermining the basic unit of Sahrawi society: the Sahrawi 
family.  
Indeed, before the degree of Spanish public support for Aicha’s ‘liberation’ had 
become clear, Polisario’s representative in Spain at the time officially indicated that 
Polisario would not become involved in Aicha’s case since it was “a very personal 
problem, between families” (quoted in Peregil 2002). Refusing to intrude in Sahrawi 
family life and parental decisions over their daughters, he argued that “if more silent 
methods had been used, this case could have been resolved” (ibid), reiterating claims that 
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these girls’ cases were ‘private’ rather than ‘political’ matters. However, having 
recognised that these Sahrawi families’ decisions and acts had the potential to destabilise 
the public humanitarian/solidarity network which provides essential material and political 
support to the camps and the Sahrawi nationalist project, Polisario/SADR ultimately 
succumbed to the pressure applied by Spanish civil and political organisations and 
‘negotiated’ the girls’ ‘release’ from their biological parents, and their ‘return’ to Spain 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2006, 2010a).  
A delicate balance is therefore constantly being negotiated between Sahrawis who 
recognise their dependence upon Spanish humanitarian aid and political support, and yet 
fear that the cohesion and continuity of their families and households, and broader camp 
society, may be at threat due to this dependence. Although SADR indicated in 
communications with HRW that “some Spanish families are profiteering from the tragic 
situations of Sahrawis to seize some children” (2008, 184, emphasis added), and a 
Sahrawi blogger adamantly concludes that “all of the solidarity offered by all of [the 
host-families in Spain] is not worth the risk of even one of our children being kidnapped 
[by delinquent solidarios],” Polisario’s decision to intervene in Sahrawi family life to 
‘protect’ ‘its’ refugee women was ultimately directly influenced by Spanish pressure and 
at odds with local preferences (Wurud 2008).  
While Spanish actors were therefore able to exert leverage over Polisario through 
threats to withdraw or withhold aid from the refugee camps, Polisario may 
simultaneously have recognised that a potential threat was emerging both to its 
internationally projected image of being the legitimate authorities of the camps, and, 
relatedly, of the camps as spaces of gender equality and freedom from violence against 
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women (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010). Indeed, by securing these girls’ ‘release’, Polisario 
therefore demonstrated its capacity to exert its legitimate control over its refugee-citizens 
in the camps (male and female, adult and child), and simultaneously to uphold the key 
characteristics celebrated by Western audiences: democracy, good governance and 
women’s rights. They were thus able to reinstate their position as the de facto authority 
over Sahrawi refugees as a whole, and, in line with their ratification of protocols relating 
to women’s and children’s rights, as the legitimate protectors of Sahrawi refugee girls 
and women more specifically. 
While Spanish families, civil society and politico-legal actors challenged Polisario 
to uphold its status as a responsible, liberal ‘government’ and state by ‘protecting’ Aicha, 
Huria and Fatimetu in line with Spanish priorities, the experiences of Mimouna in 2008 
and 2009 reveal a major shift in the ways in which the issue of responsibility and 
legitimate authority over Sahrawi young women has come to be conceptualised by 
Spanish state and non-state actors.  
 
Revisiting responsibility to protect: the ‘later’ challenge 
Unlike Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu, who had all been individually fostered by Spanish 
families in their early-teens, Mimouna left the Sahrawi refugee camps with her birth-
family to live in Spain in 1999. In August 2008, however, aged 19, Mimouna disappeared 
from Spain and was reportedly forcibly returned to the camps by her birth-family. While 
Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu were reclaimed by their Spanish foster-families, in 
Mimouna’s case, it was her Spanish fiancé who reported her disappearance to the local 
court in Lucena, claiming that she had been kidnapped by her mother and siblings; had 
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been forcibly taken from Spain to the Algerian port of Oran (reportedly at knife point); 
and was being retained against her will in the camps (Planelles 2009). For the first time, a 
reference to Mimouna’s risk of being forced into marriage against her will in the camps 
was projected in the international arena (M.P. 2008a). No such assertions were ever made 
in the cases of Aicha, Fatimetu or Huria, whose ‘Spanish families’ did not justify their 
attempts to secure their return to Spain in this way.  
Nonetheless, paralleling the cases of Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu, Mimouna’s 
fiancé, friends and legal team called upon Polisario to secure her release. In their 
increasingly public statements, the fiancé and his lawyer called upon the ‘Sahrawi 
government’ in the camps, via its Polisario ‘representatives’ in Spain, to protect the 
human rights of ‘its citizens’ in general, specifically declaring that Polisario and the 
‘Sahrawi government’ “have moral and legal obligations” to protect Sahrawi women 
(Radio Lucena 2009). Furthermore, as noted by the lawyer, a petition was launched with 
the specific objective to “make the Sahrawi authorities reflect, as they are the only ones 
who can get [Maimouna] out of the camps” (Caravaca 2009). In so doing, Mimouna’s 
fiancé and his lawyer explicitly recognised Polisario’s diplomatic presence in Spain and 
SADR’s role in the camps, but stressed that their trust in SADR was conditional upon 
Polisario/SADR protecting Sahrawi women like Mimouna in the camps and beyond. 
Indeed, this case confirms the extent to which the broader Spanish-Sahrawi humanitarian 
and political support system is grounded upon gender-based conditionalities, demanding 
the intervention of state and non-state actors within and outside of Sahrawi households in 
the camps and in Spain alike (also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009, 2010a). However, unlike the 
continued and continuous reference to Polisario as the main interlocutor and agent of 
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‘protection’ in Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu’s cases, Mimouna’s fiancé and legal entourage 
eventually, on 8 January 2009, called upon the Sahrawis’ Algerian host state to become 
involved to ‘liberate’ this Sahrawi woman. 
 
Sahrawi, Spanish or Algerian authority over Sahrawi female subjects?  
Spain’s principal requests, as submitted by the Spanish judge to the Algerian authorities 
via a letter rogatory4 were twofold: that the Algerian authorities facilitate Mimouna’s 
return to Spain on the grounds that she was a claimant and witness in a Spanish court 
case; that the Algerian court in the military town of Tindouf (the closest town to the 
refugee camps) should question Mimouna’s mother and brothers apropos Mimouna’s 
abduction, in addition to establishing the details of her treatment during the abduction and 
whilst held in the camps (Europa Press 2009a). In the meantime, the Spanish judge 
confiscated Mimouna’s father’s and brother’s passports to prevent them from leaving the 
country, as they had remained in Spain while Mimouna was reportedly taken to the 
camps by her mother and other brothers (also M.P. 2008b). Limiting these two male 
relatives’ mobility, and enforcing their presence within the Spanish national territory, was 
thus perceived as a key means to achieve Mimouna’s freedom of movement in/from the 
camps and to secure her safe return to her legitimate home, Spain. 
Spain’s intervention is, legally speaking, understandable since the ‘crimes’ of 
‘abduction’ took place on Spanish territory, and Spain therefore has clear jurisdiction 
over these cases. Furthermore, the abovementioned Spanish requests for Algeria’s 
interventions are broadly in line with the arguments presented by HRW and OHCHR, as 
quoted above. HRW has also argued that:  
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The government of the host country, Algeria–which is accountable under international 
law for protecting the rights of all persons within its territory–has ceded de facto 
administration of the camps to a liberation movement that is not formally accountable in 
the international system for its human rights practices. 
 
However, despite this international obligation OHCHR (para. 39) notes that: 
 
While the [Sahrawi] refugees are present in the territory of Algeria, the [Algerian] 
authorities reiterated during meetings with … the [OHCHR] delegation that despite this 
presence, the responsibility for human rights and any other related matters lies with the 
Government of the SADR. 
 
Indeed, while the Spanish courts attempted to summon Algerian national responsibility to 
secure Mimouna’s release from the camps, Algeria repeatedly asserted SADR’s authority 
as the ‘Government’ of the Sahrawi people, and refused to comply with the letter 
rogatory, inviting the Spanish Government to enter into direct diplomatic communication 
with the SADR Government (Europa Press 2009b). However, although Mimouna’s father 
challenged the Spanish judge “to go to the camps and speak with my wife and children 
there” (Albert 2009), neither the Spanish judge nor the Spanish Embassy in Algiers have 
the authority to do so given the Algerian government’s refusal to cooperate. Rather, as 
noted by the lawyer in charge of Mimouna’s case, “there is a juridical limbo whereby 
Spain does not recognise the Sahrawi Arab Republic as a state”, while Algeria “does not 
consider the case to be its own, since the Polisario Front has its own tribunal and is 
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recognised by Algeria” (quoted in Radio Lucena 2009). Algeria’s refusal to cooperate 
with the Spanish authorities in this case is also particularly notable given that Algeria had 
granted Mimouna a passport, but not Algerian citizenship, highlighting another anomaly 
in the Sahrawi context: refugees have access to various passports and travel documents to 
enhance their mobility for education, health and employment, without such passports 
embodying a legal tie with the granting state itself. 
 
This case-study therefore demonstrates the extent to which state and non-state actors in a 
country such as Spain may use different means to ‘reach’ outside of its borders in order to 
‘protect’ non-citizen women who were ‘abducted’ from its territory (and its families). 
While both Polisario and the Algerian government actively evaded the invocation of their 
responsibility to offer protection to Mimouna, it is notable that Spanish families, civil 
society and politico-legal actors alike should have so proactively developed a 
multifaceted strategy to secure Mimouna’s ‘release’ from the camps, and her ‘return 
home’ to Spain. Such strategies included two failed ‘liberation’ attempts by members of 
Spanish civil society who intended to ‘free’ Mimouna from the camps (Caravaca 2009), 
and Mimouna’s boyfriend’s eventual ‘success’ in ‘saving’ her from her mother at the 
Algerian port of Oran in December 2009. In many ways, building upon the 
‘appropriation’ of Sahrawi children fostered by Spanish families noted above, Spanish 
claims to protect Mimouna (and Aicha, Fatimetu and Huria before her) were founded 
upon an equation of Sahrawi girls and women with ‘us’ (where us=Spain), leading to the 
representation of a Spanish need to protect ‘our’ Sahrawi refugee women from ‘their’ 
Sahrawi culture and family.  
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In many respects, representations and perceptions of Sahrawi refugee girls’ and 
women’s ‘moral membership’5 of Spanish families and broader society can be traced to 
earlier colonial ties, and elements of ‘colonial guilt’ felt by Spanish civil society due to 
Spain’s failure to appropriately decolonise the Western Sahara and its inhabitants; 
members of Spanish civil society regularly assert Spain’s responsibility for the Sahrawis’ 
protracted exile, a feeling of moral and political responsibility which underpins the 
solidarity movement which provides Polisario/SADR with essential humanitarian and 
political support (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011). 
More importantly, perhaps, these cases demonstrate the extent to which Spanish 
foster-families and Spanish civil society are perceived and widely represented in the 
Spanish media and politico-legal institutions as holding greater legitimacy than Sahrawi 
families over ‘their’ daughters. In these high-profile campaigns, the ‘protection’ of 
Sahrawi refugee women is invoked and pursued by Spanish non-state actors who declare 
their own moral and legal obligation to liberate ‘our’ oppressed girls and women from 
‘their’ oppressive households and culture by demanding that the Spanish state, 
Polisario/SADR, and/or the Algerian state enact their politico-legal authority over these 
young female subjects. 
 
Conclusion 
By analysing the high-profile campaigns surrounding the ‘abduction’ of four Sahrawi 
refugee young women between 2002 and 2009, this article has examined the gendered 
protection narratives invoked by diverse state and non-state actors to secure Aicha’s, 
Huria’s, Fatimetu’s and Maimouna’s ‘liberation’ from their birth-families and birth-
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camps. While a number of boys and young men have also reportedly been ‘returned’ to 
the camps by their birth-families following short- and long-term fostering arrangements 
in Spain, the degree of public attention and anxiety expressed over the need to ‘protect’ 
these Sahrawi girls and women from their families is particularly notable, reflecting the 
extent to which gender, age and religion intersect in the identification of which migrant 
bodies warrant, and indeed deserve, state protection across different geopolitical contexts. 
In the cases briefly explored above, it can be argued that relations of intimacy, belonging 
and responsibility to protect have been realigned to favour Spanish families (Aicha, Huria 
and Fatimetu’s foster-parents on the one hand, and Mimouna’s Spanish fiancé on the 
other) to the detriment of Sahrawi families. The young women’s physical, emotional and 
discursive separation from their biological families has been paralleled by the 
delegitimisation of the Sahrawi birth-families’ ties to their daughters and sisters, and the 
public naturalisation of the Spanish families’ concern for and public interventions to 
‘save’ these young women from their ‘ignorant’ and ‘egotistic’ parents (op cit). In line 
with broader literatures which recognise that “the intimate is a coproduction with the 
public” (Oswin and Olund 2010, 60), the intimate ties between the young women, their 
Spanish families, and Spanish society more broadly have been publically reinforced, 
solidified and legitimated through these campaigns, which have in turn demanded both 
Spanish and Sahrawi interventions in Sahrawi intimate relations and intimate spheres.  
In the cases explored above, a wide network of families, members of Spanish civil 
society and NGO workers, alongside Spanish officials including lawyers, judges and 
ministers, have declared themselves responsible for the ‘protection’ of female Sahrawi 
refugee ‘abductees’ outside of Spanish national territory. However, Spain’s determination 
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and ability to ‘rescue’ these women from their families in the Sahrawi camps has been 
greatly complicated in these cases by virtue of long-standing struggles over political and 
discursive control over the Sahrawi camps and their inhabitants. Since Polisario explicitly 
claims to represent and act as a ‘state’ towards its ‘refugee-citizens’, whilst both Algeria 
(the host-state) and Polisario have denied legal responsibility over ‘abductees’ such as 
Aicha, Fatimetu, Huria and Mimouna, the question of ‘sovereignty’ and legal 
responsibility over the inhabitants of the Sahrawi refugee camps is actively accentuated 
by such cases. With both Polisario and the Algerian government refusing to address these 
‘abductions,’ Spanish assumptions regarding the necessity and justifiability of ‘outside 
intervention’ to ‘protect’ oppressed women are reinforced. As such, the Sahrawi refugee 
camps are increasingly viewed by Spain as “spaces in which [they, i.e. the Spanish 
authorities] are entitled to exercise a form of sovereignty.”6 Indeed, it could be argued 
that Spanish interventions to monitor and influence intimate family/household relations 
are an effective means of controlling camp spaces which lie beyond Spain’s national 
jurisdiction. In this sense, the intimate aid system which underpins the camps’ material 
and political survival is characterised not only by intimate ties of dependency between 
families, but provide the foundations for diverse forms of intimate governmentality of 
Sahrawi family life and private spheres by Sahrawi and Spanish authorities alike.  
Ironically, while the Sahrawi refugee camps have systematically been heralded as 
the “best run refugee camps in the world” (op cit) and as models of self-sufficiency 
characterised by democracy and gender equality, such cases threaten to reinforce 
outsiders’ sense of the necessity and justifiability of their involvement and exertion of 
their power over the camps and their inhabitants. Equally, they solidify the more specific 
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preference held by donor states that refugee camps should be administered by donor 
experts (Harrell-Bond 1986), and broader assumptions held by the international 
community regarding the necessity of ‘outside experts’ intervening to resolve refugee 
crises and to ‘protect’ refugee women across the south and the north alike. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 All translations from Spanish are my own. 
2 The term ‘tentacles’ is used in the case of a British-Pakistani dual national facing forced marriage in 
Pakistan, in which Justice Hogg concludes that “in these dire and exceptional circumstances the tentacles of 
the court could stretch towards Pakistan to rescue a girl who was and always had been a British child and 
who was seeking British help” (RB v FB and MA [2008], 1624; emphasis added).  
3 See www.elparchedigital.com/pags/huria/Documento_acogimiento.doc (accessed: 10 December 2005) for 
a completed fostering agreement. 
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4 “Broadly defined, a letter rogatory is a formal request from a court of one country to a court of another to 
perform some judicial act. The act requested may be service of summons, subpoena, or other legal notice, 
the taking of evidence, or the execution of a civil judgment” (see Gerber 1964, 1379). 
5 Gibney, personal communication, 7 July 2011. 
6 While applied here to Spain’s relationship with the “spaces” of the Sahrawi refugee camps, in the original 
citation Verdirame is discussing the UNHCR’s dominance and control over refugee camps elsewhere, 
noting the UNHCR’s power to prevent external observers from entering “their” camps, despite permission 
having been granted by the host government (1999, 70). 
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